For values in science

Assessing recent arguments for the ideal of value-free science

authored by

Matthew J. Brown

Abstract

There is a near consensus among philosophers of science whose research focuses on science and values that the ideal of value-free science is untenable, and that science not only is, but normatively must be, value-laden in some respect. The consensus is far from complete; with some regularity, defenses of the value-free ideal (VFI) as well as critiques of major arguments against the VFI surface in the literature. I review and respond to many of the recent defenses of the VFI and show that they generally fail to meet the mark. In the process, I articulate what the current burden of argument for a defense of the VFI ought to be, given the state of the literature.

Organisation(s)

Institute of Philosophy

External Organisation(s)

Southern Illinois University

Type

Article

Journal

SYNTHESE

Volume

204

ISSN

0039-7857

Publication date

10.2024

Publication status

Published

Peer reviewed

Yes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Philosophy, General Social Sciences

Electronic version(s)

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04762-1 (Access: Open)