For values in science

Assessing recent arguments for the ideal of value-free science

verfasst von

Matthew J. Brown

Abstract

There is a near consensus among philosophers of science whose research focuses on science and values that the ideal of value-free science is untenable, and that science not only is, but normatively must be, value-laden in some respect. The consensus is far from complete; with some regularity, defenses of the value-free ideal (VFI) as well as critiques of major arguments against the VFI surface in the literature. I review and respond to many of the recent defenses of the VFI and show that they generally fail to meet the mark. In the process, I articulate what the current burden of argument for a defense of the VFI ought to be, given the state of the literature.

Organisationseinheit(en)

Institut für Philosophie

Externe Organisation(en)

Southern Illinois University (SIU)

Typ

Artikel

Journal

SYNTHESE

Band

204

ISSN

0039-7857

Publikationsdatum

10.2024

Publikationsstatus

Veröffentlicht

Peer-reviewed

Ja

ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete

Philosophie, Allgemeine Sozialwissenschaften

Elektronische Version(en)

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04762-1 (Zugang: Offen)