Effects of patent privateering on settlements and R&D under sequential market entry

verfasst von

Felix B. Klapper, Christian Siemering

Abstract

We investigate patent litigation, settlements and R&D incentives on a market where two firms develop technologies in order to obtain patents and produce goods. Firms may sell IP rights to a Patent Assertion Entity (PAE) that acts as intermediary for patent monetization. We find that compared to simultaneous market entry, the effect of this so-called patent privateering is mitigated if firms enter sequentially. Furthermore, we show that privateering may decrease industry profits by distortion of R&D incentives even when there is no rent extraction by the PAE.

Organisationseinheit(en)

Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät

Typ

Artikel

Journal

Information economics and policy

Band

66

Anzahl der Seiten

14

ISSN

0167-6245

Publikationsdatum

03.2024

Publikationsstatus

Veröffentlicht

Peer-reviewed

Ja

ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete

Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie, Management, Monitoring, Politik und Recht

Elektronische Version(en)

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2024.101080 (Zugang: Offen)