The invisible hand plays dice

Multiple equilibria in sects markets

verfasst von

Panu Poutvaara, Andreas Wagener

Abstract

Religious participation is much more widespread in the United States than in Europe, while Europeans tend to view sects more suspiciously than Americans. We propose an explanation for these patterns without assuming differences in preferences or market fundamentals. We study a religious market where both demand and supply of spiritual services are endogenous. Such markets may have multiple equilibria. Further, equilibria with more sects result in higher welfare and lower membership costs, as secular societies tend to host on average more demanding sects.

Organisationseinheit(en)

Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik

Externe Organisation(en)

Universität Helsinki

Typ

Artikel

Journal

PUBLIC CHOICE

Band

145

Seiten

483-502

Anzahl der Seiten

20

ISSN

0048-5829

Publikationsdatum

12.2010

Publikationsstatus

Veröffentlicht

Peer-reviewed

Ja

ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete

Soziologie und Politikwissenschaften, Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie

Elektronische Version(en)

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9576-y (Zugang: Geschlossen)